Selective opening attacks against commitment schemes occur when the commitment scheme is repeated in parallel (or concurrently) and an adversary can choose depending on the commit-phase transcript to see the values and openings to some subset of the committed bits. Commitments are secure under such attacks if one can prove that the remaining, unopened commitments stay secret.
1. For parallel composition, 4 (resp. 5) rounds are necessary and sufficient to build computationally (resp. statistically) binding and computationally hiding commitments. Also, there are no perfectly binding commitments. 
Introduction
Commitment schemes have a wide array of applications in cryptography, one of the most notable being the construction of zero knowledge protocols [14, 4] . A problem that arises in the use of commitment schemes is whether their hiding property holds when composed in parallel: if some subset of the committed messages are opened, do the remaining unopened messages remain secure? This question arose early in the study of zero knowledge protocols, and whether they remain zero knowledge when composed in parallel. It is natural in other cryptographic contexts as well, whenever commitments are used as building blocks for protocols that might be then used in parallel (e.g. secure multi-party computation, etc.).
Although naively one might think that because commitments are hiding that no additional information should be leaked by composing them, nevertheless it is unknown how to prove that standard stand-alone commitments (e.g. [18] ) remain hiding when composed.
More formally, a selective opening attack on a commitment scheme allows a cheating receiver to interact in k parallel (or concurrent) commitments, and then ask the sender to open some subset I ⊆ [k] of the commitments. The question is whether the unopened messages remain hidden in the following sense: is there a simulator strategy for every cheating receiver strategy that outputs a commit-phase transcript, a set I ⊂ [k], and decommitments to (b i ) i∈I that is indistinguishable from the output of the cheating receiver with an honest sender?
In this paper we show that techniques both for constructions and lower bounds from the study of zero knowledge protocols can be applied to the study of commitments secure against selective opening attacks. We study the minimal round complexity needed to construct such commitments, and give solutions for commitments secure against selective opening attacks that are optimal or nearly optimal up to small factors.
Our results

Comparison to previous constructions
Notions related to security against selective opening attacks have previously been studied in the literature. Security against selective opening is closely related to chameleon blobs [5, 6] , trapdoor commitments [11] , and equivocable commitments [2, 9, 8] . Roughly speaking, these notions all allow a simulator that can generate commit-phase transcripts that can be opened in many ways. Indeed, our constructions will be based on the equivocable commitment of [8] .
Security against selective opening may be weaker than the notions above, and was directly studied in [10, 3] . Bellare et al. [3] give a construction of a scheme that is CC-SB secure, but this construction is non-black-box and requires applying a concurrent zero knowledge proof on a statement regarding the code implementing a one-way permutation. In contrast, all constructions presented in this paper are fully black-box.
Remark 1.5 (Equivalence of statistical hiding and statistical binding). In this work we only study commitments with computational hiding. [3] already noted that stand-alone SH commitments satisfy a notion of PAR-SH security based on indistinguishability (this notion is different from ours). Independent of our work, Zhang et al. [24] gave a black-box reduction that uses t-round stand-alone SH commitments and one-way permutations to construct (t + 3)-round PAR-SH commitments (under our definition of selective opening security). Their construction is an extension of a recent trapdoor commitment of Pass and Wee [19] .
With Item 2 of Theorem 1.2, this implies that constant-round statistical hiding and constantround statistical binding are equivalent via black-box reductions when security against selective opening attacks is required. This contrasts sharply with the stand-alone case, as 2-round statistically binding commitments are equivalent to one-way functions, but no black-box reduction can build o(n/ log n)-round statistically hiding commitment from one-way functions [15] .
Comparison to previous lower bounds
Bellare et al. [3] proved that non-interactive commitments and perfectly binding commitments secure against selective opening attacks cannot be based on any black-box cryptographic assumption. Our lower bounds are stronger than theirs in that we can rule out 3-or 4-round rather than non-interactive commitments, as well as ruling out certain types of commitment with non-zero statistical binding error. However, our proof technique is incomparable to theirs.
Ways in which our lower bounds are stronger: first, the lower bounds of [3] assume blackbox access to a cryptographic primitive, and therefore do not apply to constructions based on concrete assumptions (e.g. factoring, discrete log, lattice problems) where one might hope to exploit the specific structure of those problems to achieve security. In contrast, our results immediately rule out all constructions in the plain model.
Second, the lower bounds of [3] prove that non-interactive and perfectly binding commitments secure against selective opening attacks are impossible with respect to a very specific message distribution that is defined in terms of a random oracle. One could argue that the message distribution they consider is artificial and would not arise in applications of these commitments.
In particular, it may suffice for applications to build commitments that are secure only for particular natural message distributions, such as the uniform distribution or the distributions encountered when using commitments to build zero knowledge proofs for NP. [3] does not rule out the existence of commitments that are secure only for these message distributions, while our impossibility results do and in fact apply simultaneously to all message distributions satisfying what we argue are very natural constraints (see Definition 2.5). In particular, the results of [3] also use the assumptions in Definition 2.5.
Ways in which our lower bounds are weaker: our results are weaker because they only apply to constructions with black-box simulators, i.e. we require that there exists a single simulator that works given black-box access to any cheating receiver. The results of [3] hold even for slightly non-black-box simulation techniques: they only require that for every cheating receiver oracle algorithm (Rec ′ ) (·) that accesses the underlying crypto primitive as a black-box, there exists an efficient oracle algorithm Sim (·) that accesses the underling crypto primitive as a black box that generates an indistinguishable transcript. 1 
Our techniques
Our constructions for parallel composition are essentially the equivocable commitment scheme of [8] , while the case for concurrent composition follows in a straight-forward way by combining the commitment of [8] with the preamble from the concurrent zero knowledge proof of [21] .
Our lower bounds are proven by observing that most known lower bounds for zero knowledge (e.g. [13, 17, 7, 16, 20] ) extend naturally to the case of commitment schemes. Lower bounds for zero knowledge show that if a zero knowledge proof for L satisfies certain restrictions (e.g. 3 rounds, constant-round public coin [13] 
As was observed by [10, 3] , plugging a t-round PAR-CBCH commitment into the GMW zero knowledge protocol for NP allows the zero knowledge property to be preserved under parallel repetition, thus allowing one to reduce soundness error while preserving zero knowledge and without increasing round complexity. Furthermore, the resulting protocol has t + 2 rounds, and has a black-box simulator if the commitment had a black-box simulator. This immediately implies the following: Proposition 1.6 ( [13] , weak impossibility of PAR-CBCH, informal). In the plain model, there exist no black-box simulator non-interactive or constant-round public-coin PAR-CBCH commitment schemes.
To see why, suppose there were such a scheme, then by the above discussion one would obtain either a 3-round or constant-round public-coin zero knowledge argument for NP with a blackbox simulator that remains zero knowledge under parallel repetition. By [13] , this implies that NP = BPP. But this contradicts the existence of a PAR-CBCH commitment scheme, since by the Cook-Levin reduction we can use an algorithm solving NP to break any commitment.
Our results improve upon Proposition 1.6 as they apply to broader categories of commitments (e.g. 3-round vs. non-interactive). In addition, Proposition 1.6 uses the Cook-Levin reduction and therefore does not apply when considering schemes that might use random oracles. In contrast, Theorem 1.2 does hold relative to any oracle, and in the case of Item 3 of Theorem 1.2, is black-box. This is important for two reasons: first, Proposition 1.6 does not say whether such constructions are possible in the random oracle model, which is often used to prove the security of schemes for which we cannot prove security in the plain model. Second, if we want to compose our impossibility result with other black-box lower bounds, then our impossibility result had better also be black-box. For example, in order to obtain Corollary 1.3 we must combine Item 3 of Theorem 1.2 with the black-box lower bound of Haitner et al.. This is only possible if Item 3 of Theorem 1.2 is a black-box reduction, which would not be true using the approach of the weak impossibility result Proposition 1.6.
To prove Theorem 1.2, we construct what we call "blindfolded senders": senders that run the commit phase without knowing the bits that must be revealed. We show that the existence of such blindfolded senders implies that binding can be broken. We then construct blindfolded senders for various kinds of protocols by applying the proof strategy for zero knowledge lower bounds originally outlined by Goldreich and Krawczyk [13] . By arguing directly, we avoid the Cook-Levin step in Proposition 1.6 and therefore our results hold relative to any oracle.
Preliminaries
For a random variable X, we let x ← R X denote a sample drawn according to X. We let U k denote the uniform distribution over {0, 1} k . For a set S, we let x ← R S denote a uniform element of S. Let 2 S denote the set of all subsets of S. All security definitions in this paper are with respect to non-uniform circuits. We say that an event occurs with overwhelming probability if it occurs with probability 1− n −ω (1) , and that it occurs with negligible probability if it occurs with probability n −ω (1) . Two families of random variables (X n ) n∈N , (Y n ) n∈N over {0, 1} n are computationally indistinguishable, or equivalently X ≈ c Y , if for all circuits C of size poly(n) it holds that | Pr[C(
Commitment schemes
A commitment scheme is a two-phase interactive protocol between a sender and a receiver. They are a digital analogue of locked safes: in the commit phase, the sender puts his message inside the safe, locks the safe, and sends it to the receiver without the key. Thus, after the commit phase the sender can only reveal the message he committed to (the commitment is binding), but without the key the receiver has no idea what that message is (the commitment is hiding). In the opening or decommit phase, the sender reveals the key to the receiver who can then learn the value of the message and be assured that it was exactly what the sender originally committed to. It is well-known that a commitment can be statistically binding or statistically hiding (i.e. secure even against unbounded adversaries), but not both.
We now formally define commitments for single-bit messages; since we will be concerned with commitments that are composable, multi-bit messages can be handled by just repeating the single-bit protocol in parallel or concurrently. Definition 2.1. A t-round (stand-alone) commitment protocol is a pair of efficient algorithms Send and Rec. Given a sender input b ∈ {0, 1}, we define:
1. The commit phase transcript is τ = Send(b; ω Send ), Rec(ω Rec ) where ω Send , ω Rec are the random coins of the sender and receiver, respectively. Exactly t messages are exchanged in the commit phase t. 
Notation and variable definitions:
We assume that a commitment scheme is put in a canonical form, where each party alternates speaking. We assume the number of rounds is even and the receiver speaks first. If the number of rounds is 2t, then we label the sender's messages α 1 , . . . , α t and the receiver's messages β 1 , . . . , β t , and we let α [i] = (α 1 , . . . , α i ) and likewise for β [i] . For a commitment protocol (Send, Rec), we write that the receiver's i'th response β i is given by computing
are the first i − 1 sender messages, and ω are the receiver's random coins. We let Rec(⊥; ω) = β 1 denote the first receiver message.
Let k denote the number of parallel or concurrent repetitions of a commitment protocol. Let n denote the security parameter of the protocol. For stand-alone (Send, Rec), let Send k denote the k-fold repeated sender (context will determine whether we mean parallel or concurrent composition). Let Rec k denote the k-fold parallel receiver, and let Rec k Σ denote the k-fold concurrent receiver with schedule Σ. Underlined variables denote vectors of message bits (e.g. b ∈ {0, 1} k ) and plain letters with indices the bit at each coordinate (e.g. b i is the i'th bit of b).
Binding Definition 2.2 (Binding).
A commitment scheme (Send, Rec) is computationally (resp. statistically) binding if for all polynomial-time (resp. unbounded) sender strategies Send ′ , only with negligible probability can Send It is straight-forward to prove that all the variants of the binding property are preserved under parallel/concurrent composition.
Hiding under selective opening attacks
We only study the case of computational hiding (see Remark 1.5). In the following, I ⊆ 2 [k] is a family of subsets of [k] , which denotes the set of legal subsets of commitments that the receiver is allowed to ask to be opened. 1. Send k , Rec ′ run k executions of the commit phase in parallel using independent random coins, obtaining k commit-phase transcripts τ k = (τ 1 , . . . , τ k ).
Rec
′ chooses a set I ← R I and sends it to Send k . 3. Send k sends (b i , ω i ) for all i ∈ I, where ω i is an opening of the i'th commitment.
In Item 2, the honest receiver is defined to pick I ∈ I uniformly, while a malicious receiver may pick I adversarially.
Definition 2.4 (Hiding under selective opening, parallel composition). Let I ⊆ 2 [k] be a family of subsets and B be a family of message distributions over {0, 1} k for all k. Let (Send, Rec) be a commitment and Sim k be a simulator. We say that (Send, Rec) is secure against selective opening attacks for (I, B) if for all k:
be the complete interaction between Rec ′ and the honest sender, including the commit-phase transcript τ k , the subset I of coordinates to be opened and the openings (b i , ω i ) i∈I .
• Let (Sim
interacts with Rec ′ (without knowledge of b) and outputs a subset I of bits to be opened. Then Sim k is given {b i } i∈I . Using this, Sim k interacts with Rec ′ some more and outputs a commit-phase transcript τ k , the set I, and the openings {(b i , ω i )} i∈I .
• It holds that (Sim
Definition 2.5. We say that (I, B) is non-trivial if (the uniform distribution over) I, B are efficiently samplable, |I| = k ω(1) and also Pr
Here B I is the joint distribution of bits B i for i ∈ I. Property 1 says that if the receiver asks for a random set in I to be opened, then the sender cannot guess the set with noticeable probability. This restriction is natural because in many contexts if the sender can guess the set to be opened then it can cheat in the larger protocol where the commitment is being used (e.g. in a zero knowledge proof). Property 2 says that with noticeable probability over the choice of I, there is non-negligible entropy in the bits revealed. This is very natural as otherwise any receiver is trivially simulable since it always sees the same constant bits. This non-triviality condition suffices for all our lower bounds except Item 3 and Item 4 of Theorem 1.2; see their respective sections for further discussion.
Stronger definitions of hiding Our definitions are chosen to be as weak as possible in order to make our lower bounds stronger. Nevertheless, our positive results also satisfy a stronger definition of security, where security should hold simultaneously for all I, B. For such a notion, we prepend STR to the name of the security property (e.g. STR-PAR-SB).
Definition 2.6 (Security game for k-fold concurrent composition). Identical to the parallel case, except that the receiver has the power to schedule messages as he wishes, rather than sending them in parallel. In addition, we allow the receiver to pick the set I incrementally subject to the constraint that at the end, I ∈ I. For example, the receiver can generate one commit-phase transcript, ask the sender to decommit that instance, then use this information in its interaction to generate the second commit-phase transcript, and so forth.
Definition 2.7 (Hiding under selective opening, concurrent composition). Same as the parallel case, except that the simulator can incrementally ask for the values (b i ) i∈I before completing all commit-phase executions, subject to the constraint that at the end I ∈ I.
Discussion of definitional choices: One could weaken Definition 2.6 to require that although all the commit-phase transcripts may be generated concurrently, the openings happen simultaneously. Indeed, this was the definition used in [3] . We do not work with this weakening because it makes the definition not truly concurrent: forcing all the openings to occur simultaneously "synchronizes" the sessions.
Inaccessible entropy
All our definitions here are taken from [16] , and we refer the reader there for motivation, intuition, and lemmas regarding how they are manipulated. Let A, B denote interactive TM's, and let A i , B i be the random variable describing i'th message sent by A, B respectively. We note that [16] denote "smoothed" versions of entropy that take into account A, B that can abort; for simplicity we define our notions without this subtlety.
Definition 2.8. Given a 2t-round interactive protocol (A, B), we define the sample-entropy of a transcript τ = A, B = (a 1 , b 1 , . . . , a t , b t ) from A's point of view to be
We say that the A has real min-entropy if
In our setting, typically A will be the receiver and B will be the sender. We write A before B as this is the convention used in [16] . . . , b t , a t , w t , s t ) as:
We say that A has context-independent accessible max-entropy at most k if there is no efficient A * and efficient predicate success such that:
1. For any view v, success(v) implies that v is consistent with A (i.e. for all i, A(
3. For all (possibly inefficient) B * , it holds that
Constructions
Di Crescenzo and Ostrovsky [8] (see also [9] ) showed how to build an equivocable commitment scheme. Equivocable means that for every cheating receiver Rec ′ , there exists a simulator that generates a commit-phase transcript that is computationally indistinguishable from a real transcript, but which the simulator can decommit to both 0 and 1. Equivocation seems even stronger than STR-PAR-CBCH security, except that STR-PAR-CBCH explicitly requires security to hold against selective opening attacks. Although it is not clear how to generically convert any stand-alone equivocable commitment to an equivocable commitment that is composable in parallel/concurrently, the particular construction of Di Crescenzo and Ostrovsky can be composed by using a suitable preamble.
The DO construction consists of a preamble, which is a coin-flipping scheme that outputs a random string, followed by running Naor's commitment based on OWF [18] using the random string of the preamble as the receiver's first message. Depending on how the preamble is constructed, we get either a STR-PAR-CBCH, STR-PAR-SB, or STR-CC-SB commitment. Therefore, Theorem 1.1 follows from Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 3.5 below. We now present three different preambles that when used in the protocol above, provide STR-PAR-CBCH, STR-PAR-SB, and STR-CC-SB security, respectively.
Protocol 3.2 ([8]). Preambles for STR-PAR-CBCH or STR-PAR-SB:
1. Using the non-interactive stand-alone CH commitment based on one-way permutations (to achieve STR-PAR-CBCH) or a t-round stand-alone SH commitment (to achieve STR-PAR-SB), the receiver sends a commitment to α ← R {0, 1} 3n .
2. The sender replies with β ← R {0, 1} 3n .
3. The receiver opens α.
4. Output σ = α ⊕ β.
Theorem 3.3. ([8]) Protocol 3.1 with the STR-PAR-CBCH (resp. STR-PAR-SB) version of the preamble of Protocol 3.2 gives a STR-PAR-CBCH (resp. STR-PAR-SB) commitment.
Proof sketch of Theorem 3.3. We include a proof sketch for the sake of completeness, and refer the reader to [18, 12, 8] for full proofs.
The binding properties are easy to verify, given the fact that Naor's commitment scheme is statistically binding.
The following simulator works to prove security against selective opening attacks for both the computational and statistical binding variants. Consider the k-fold repetition Send k , Rec k of the protocol. Following the proof of Goldreich and Kahan [12] , one can construct a simulator such that, by rewinding the first step of the preamble (i.e. Step 1 of Protocol 3.2), can learn the value of the α 1 , . . . α k used in each of the k parallel sessions. Care must be taken to ensure this finishes in expected polynomial time, but the same technique as in [12] works in our setting and we refer the reader to that paper for details. Now for each i ∈ [k] in the i'th session the simulator can sample s 0 , s 1 ← R {0, 1} n and reply with β i = G(s 0 ) ⊕ G(s 1 ) ⊕ α i . This sets σ i = G(s 0 ) ⊕ G(s 1 ). Then the sender sends c = G(s 0 ). Now the simulator can decommit to both 0 (by sending s 0 ) and to 1 (by sending s 1 ).
Protocol 3.4 ([21]). Preamble for STR-CC-SB:
1. The receiver picks α ← R {0, 1} 3n and for ℓ = ω(log n) picks α 0 i,j ← R {0, 1} 3n for i, j ∈ [ℓ] and sets α 1 i,j = α ⊕ α 0 i,j . The receiver commits in parallel to α, α 0 i,j , α 1 i,j via a t-round statistically hiding commitment. Proof. Binding is straightforward. For hiding, observe that this is the preamble of the concurrent zero knowledge proof of Prabhakaran et al. [21] . They prove the following:
The sender checks that indeed
α = α 0 i,j ⊕ α 1 i,j for all i, j ∈ [ℓ]. If so output σ = α ⊕ β, otherwise abort.
Theorem 3.6 (Theorem 5.2 of [21], informal).
There is black-box simulator strategy that, given access to any efficient receiver for Protocol 3.4 with any concurrent scheduling, outputs with high probability in every session a string α before Step 3 such that the receiver opens to α in step 5.
Namely, [21] show that by using an appropriate rewinding schedule, the simulator can obtain the value of α in all of the concurrent executions before the sender is supposed to send β, regardless of how the receiver schedules the messages. Once the simulator knows α, one can apply the simulator strategy of [12, 8] , as in the proof sketch of Theorem 3.3.
Optimality of constructions
We now define our main tool for proving lower bounds, blindfolded senders. Intuitively, a blindfolded sender must run its commit phase without knowing what it is committing to, so if it can cause the receiver to accept with non-negligible probability, then it must be able to open its commitments in many ways.
Blindfolded senders
For a pair of algorithms T = (T com , T decom ), define the following game:
Here, state com is the internal state of T com to be transmitted to T decom . I is the set Rec k asks to be opened. Notice T com runs without knowledge of b, hence T is "blindfolded" during the commit phase.
The overall transcript (conditioned on not aborting) is ( T,
, where NoAbort T denotes the event that T does not abort. Say that (τ k , I, state com ) is δ-openable if with probability at least δ over the choice of b,
, state com )..
Definition 4.1 (Blindfolded sender). We say that
We say T is a k-blindfolded sender if it is a (k, 1/poly(n), 1 − n −ω(1) )-blindfolded sender.
Using blindfolded senders to break binding. Here we show that secure commitments cannot admit blindfolded senders. In the next few sections, we will show that certain kinds of commitments (e.g. 3-round) must admit blindfolded senders, which, combined with the following theorem, imply that those kinds of commitments cannot be secure. All of these theorems are proven via black-box reductions.
Theorem 4.2. Fix any non-trivial (I, B) and k-fold repeated commitment scheme (Send k , Rec k ) with a simulator Sim k that proves computational hiding. If this commitment has a k-blindfolded sender T = (T com , T decom ) for any k, then this commitment cannot be statistically binding. If furthermore T is efficient, then this commitment cannot be computationally binding.
Proof. The idea is to convert a k-blindfolded T sender into a sender Send ′ that breaks binding in a single execution of the commitment, Send ′ emulates T internally and chooses one of the k parallel instances to insert its interaction with the real receiver Rec. By the non-triviality of (I, B), with high probability over I ← R I the coordinates in I have significant min-entropy, and in particular some coordinate must have significant min-entropy. Therefore if Send ′ picks this coordinate, then since T is able to open its commitment with non-trivial probability for I ← R I and b ← R B, it follows that Send ′ can open its commitment to both 0 and 1 with non-negligible probability.
We now proceed formally by constructing a malicious sender Send ′ and proving that this sender breaks binding.
Algorithm 4.3.
Malicious sender Send
′ , interacting with a single honest receiver Rec:
1. Pick a random j. For each j ′ = j, sample random coins ω (j ′ ) to run an honest receiver.
2.
Respond to the i'th message β i from Rec as follows.
[i−1] ) be T com 's response from previous queries.
′ successfully generates a commit-phase transcript distributed according to T com , Rec k . Send ′ picks a random I ← R I to be opened.
4. If j / ∈ I, Send ′ aborts. Otherwise, it independently picks two b, b ′ ← R B, and runs T decom (b, I) to obtain a decommitment for (b i ) i∈I and runs T decom (b ′ , I) to obtain openings for (b ′ i ) i∈I . In particular, the malicious sender obtains openings for b j and b ′ j .
Analyzing Send ′ : By hypothesis, T is a (k, ε, 1 − n −ω(1) )-blindfolded server for some ε = 1/poly(n). This implies that with probability at least ε, T com , Rec k produces an (1 − n −ω(1) )-openable (τ k , I, state com ). Therefore, since the probability of producing an accepting opening for a random b at least (1 − n −ω(1) ), it holds with probability at least ε(1 − n −ω(1) ) 2 that Rec k accepts both openings T decom (b, τ k , I, state com ) and T decom (b ′ , τ k , I, state com ).
Since (I, B) is non-trivial, a straightforward calculation implies that Pr b,b
. Therefore with probability ε(1 − n −ω(1) ) 2 − n −ω(1)
Since the sender picked at random the coordinate j that contains the real interaction, with probability 1/k it chooses j = i and therefore with non-negligible probability produces decommitments for both 0 and 1 in an interaction with the real receiver, breaking binding.
Strong non-triviality
Some of our results require the following stronger notion of non-triviality. 
For each i ∈ [
√ k], let I i be the projection of I onto the coordinates in Π i . It holds that
This definition strengthens the non-triviality condition on (I, B) in two ways: first we require that I be a product of √ k sets, each of which is large. (Here, √ k is arbitrary, any n ε would be equivalent for our purposes.) Second, we require the amount of entropy in B I i to be large (ω(log n) rather than just 1/poly(n)) simultaneously for all i. Notice that it is still satisfied by natural (I, B) , for instance I = 2 [k] the set of all subsets of [k], and B = U k the uniform distribution over {0, 1} k . Theorem 4.5. Fix any strong non-trivial (I, B) and k-fold repeated commitment scheme (Send k , Rec k ) with a simulator Sim k that proves computational hiding. If this commitment has a (k, 1/poly(n), 1/poly(n))-blindfolded sender T = (T com , T decom ) for any k = ω(log n), then this commitment cannot be statistically binding. If furthermore T is efficient, then this commitment cannot be computationally binding.
Proof sketch. The proof is identical to Theorem 4.5, the only additional observation is that because T only guarantees with noticeable probability that the commit-phase (τ k , I, state com ) is 1/poly(n)-openable (rather than (1 − n −ω(1) )-openable), we need the stronger non-trivial guarantee to say that even sampling only from the 1/poly(n) fraction of the message distribution B that causes Rec k to accept, still we will find b, b ′ that differ on the subset I of bits to be opened.
Impossibility results for parallel composition
We construct blindfolded senders using the strategy of Goldreich and Krawczyk [13] . Intuitively, the idea is to construct a sender T whose output distribution is the same as Sim
Here, Rec h is intuitively a cheating receiver that, for each sender message, uses its hash function h to generate a response that looks completely random, and therefore Sim k gains no advantage by rewinding Rec h . From this cheating property, we will be able to conclude that T satisfies Definition 4.1 Goldreich and Krawczyk [13] observe that we can make the following simplifying assumptions w.l.o.g.: (1) Sim k makes exactly p(n) = poly(n) queries to its receiver black box, (2) all queries made by Sim k are distinct, and (3) Sim k always outputs a transcript τ k that consists of queries it made to the receiver and the corresponding receiver responses.
The following lemma from [13] says that simply by guessing uniformly at random, one can pick with some probability the queries/responses that the simulator outputs as its final transcript.
Lemma 4.6 ([13]
). Fix a black-box simulator Sim k for a protocol with t sender messages, and suppose Sim k makes p(n) queries. Draw u 1 , . . . , u t ← R [p(n)], then with probability ≥ 1/p(n) t , the final transcript output by Sim k consists of the u 1 , . . . , u t 'th queries (along with the corresponding receiver responses).
3-round commitments
Theorem 4.7. For all non-trivial (I, B) and relative to any oracle, there exists no 3-round PAR-CBCH commitment protocol secure for (I, B).
Proof. We construct a polynomial-time k-blindfolded sender for (Send, Rec) for k = n. By Theorem 4.2, this contradicts the binding property of the commitment.
Algorithm 4.8.
Blindfolded sender T = (T com , T decom ) for 3-round commitments:
2. T com internally runs Sim k , answering its queries as follows:
• For the u 1 , u 2 'th queries, if the u 1 'th query is a first sender message α 1 and the u 2 'th query is a second sender message α [2] that extends α 1 , then T com forwards them to the real receiver and forwards the receiver's responses to the simulator. Otherwise, T com aborts.
• For all other queries: if the query is α 1 , then T com returns Rec k (α 1 ; ω) for uniform ω. If the query is α [2] then T returns a random I ← R I.
3. When Sim k requests that a subset I of bits be revealed, T com checks to see if I was the set that the real receiver asked to be opened. If not, T com aborts.
4. In the opening phase, T decom receives b and feeds (b i ) i∈I to the simulator and obtains (τ k , I, (b i , open i ) i∈I ). T decom checks that τ k and I consists of queries to/from the real receiver, and if not aborts. Otherwise it outputs these openings.
theorem: although Theorem 4.2 is for the case of statistically binding, looking at its proof the reduction employed in fact shows that one can use a (k, 2 −mk6 , 1)-blindfolded receiver to build a sender strategy that breaks binding with non-zero probability, contradicting perfect binding. Suppose without loss of generality that Rec sends its random coins as the very last message in the commit phase.
Building blindfolded sender T : Let p(n) denote the maximum number of queries made by Sim k . Let t be the number of rounds in the commitment.
1. T com guesse random coins ω of the real receiver, and also picks a random subset U ⊆ [p(n)] of size t, let u 1 < u 2 < . . . < u t be its elements.
2. T com internally executes Sim k , answering its queries as follows:
• For the u j 'th query, T com forwards the query to the real receiver and forwards the response back to Sim k .
• For other queries, Sim k computes responses using the coins ω that the sender guessed.
3. At the end of the commit-phase Rec k sends all its random coins. T com checks whether it guessed the random coins correctly, and if not it aborts.
4. Sim k outputs a set I of bits to be opened. T com checks that I was the real receiver's response to a query in U , and that the query consists only of simulator queries in U and the corresponding real receiver responses. If not, T com aborts.
5. In the opening phase, T decom receives b and feeds (b i ) i∈I to the simulator and obtains (τ k , I, (b i , open i ) i∈I ). T decom checks that τ k and I consists of queries to/from the real receiver, and if not aborts. Otherwise it outputs the openings.
Analyzing blindfolded sender T : with probability 2 −mk , T com correctly guesses the receiver's random coins. By Lemma 4.6, with probability 1/p(n) t , all messages in the transcript that the simulator outputs correspond to queries in U , and so T com does not abort. Therefore the probability that T does not abort is at least 2 −mk /p(n) t ≫ 2 −mkt , and from the definition of T it is clear that (
Public-coin commitments
Theorem 4.14. For all strong non-trivial (I, B) and relative to any oracle, there exists no public-coin PAR-CBCH commitment protocol secure for (I, B).
Proof. Given any public-coin commitment protocol (Send, Rec, Sim k ) for a strong non-trivial I, we construct a (ω(log n), 1/poly(n), 1/poly(n))-blindfolded sender, which is implicit in [20] . Combined with Theorem 4.5 this implies that (Send, Rec, Sim k ) is not PAR-CBCH secure.
Building the blindfolded sender T : following [20] , our blindfolded sender will require k = poly(t) parallel sessions. Look at the partition of [k] into subsets Π = (Π 1 , . . . , Π √ k ). Because I i ⊆ 2 Π i and |I i | = n ω(1) , therefore it holds that |Π i | = ω(log n).
We consider the coordinates in a single subset of the partition to belong to one session. T com internally execute Sim k by randomly choosing one j ∈ [ √ k] of the sessions to forward to the real receiver, while the rest are internally simulated. [20] describe a strategy for T com to rewind the simulator such that, with high probability, Sim k outputs with non-negligible probability exactly the session that was forwarded to the real receiver. Roughly, for each of the t rounds of the protocol, T com forwards the next message from session k to the receiver and returns the response to the simulator. It then repeatedly runs many continuations of the simulator until it finds a continuation where the real receiver's response is likely to be included in the final output (and if no such continuation exists, T com aborts). We refer the reader to [20] for details.
T com also checks that the subset I that Sim k asks to be opened is in response to a query that consists of simulator queries and real receiver responses, and if not T com aborts. Otherwise, T decom outputs an opening using the simulator.
Analyzing the blindfolded sender T for computational binding: [20] prove that the blindfolded sender causes the receiver to accept with non-negligible probability, say ≥ ε. Then by a standard averaging argument, with probability ≥ ε/2, the T com , Rec produces an (ε/2)-openable commit-phase transcript. Therefore T is a (ω(log n), 1/poly(n), 1/poly(n))-blindfolded server.
PAR-SB commitments imply (stand-alone) SH commitments
To prove Item 2 of Theorem 1.2, we show that PAR-SB commitments can be used to generate a gap between real and accessible entropy [16] . Then we apply the transformation of [16] that converts an entropy gap into a statistically hiding commitment. Let Π be the partition such that I = I 1 × . . . × I √ k and I i ⊆ 2 Π i . For sufficiently large k, Lemma 4.16 implies there is an entropy gap for the coordinates in Π i , and by the entropy gap amplification lemma (Lemma 3.8) of [16] implies that the entropy gap sums over all of the coordinates. Therefore for large enough k the gap is sufficient to apply the black-box construction of statistically hiding commitments from entropy gaps given by Lemmas 6.7, 4.7, and 4.18 of [16] .
Proof of Lemma 4.16. The real min-entropy part of the claim follows from the definitions and amplification by parallel repetition (Proposition 3.8 in [16] ). For the accessible entropy part, we use the following: Lemma 4.17. If there exists efficient A * (and efficient predicate success, see Definition 2.9) sampling high context-independent max-entropy for Rec k , then there exists a (k, 1/poly(n), 1/poly(n))-blindfolded sender.
By Theorem 4.5 this contradicts the binding property of the commitment and so A * cannot exist.
Proof of Lemma 4.17. This lemma holds intuitively because we can use A * to perform the same role as Rec h and Rec ω 1 ,...,ωs h in the analysis of the blindfolded senders in Theorem 4.7 and Theorem 4.11. The fact that A * can access high accessible entropy essentially means that it can sample the i'th message conditioned on a partial transcript of first i − 1 messages. Applying Theorem 4.2 implies that such a blindfolded sender T would break binding property of the commitment, and therefore such A * cannot exist.
We now proceed formally.
Algorithm 4.18.
Blindfolded sender T = (T com , T decom ) for PAR-SB commitments.
1. T com picks a random subset U ⊆ [p(n)] of size t, let u 1 < u 2 < . . . < u t be its elements.
T com stores a 3. When Sim k requests that a subset I of bits be revealed, T com checks to see if I was the set that the real receiver asked to be opened. If not, T com aborts.
Analyzing T : we require the following lemmas: The only place where T may abort is if in its emulation of Sim k , the simulator tries to rewind the receiver in session j. Therefore, with probability 1/k, T inserts the real receiver into the good session that is guaranteed to exist by Lemma 4.22 with non-negligible probability. Furthermore, since the k concurrent simulation is indistinguishable from a real interaction, it follows that Rec k Σ accepts ( T, Rec k Σ | b, NoAbort T ) with overwhelming probability. Because I i ⊆ 2 Π i and |I i | = n ω(1) , therefore it holds for all i that |Π i | = ω(log n). Therefore T is a (ω(log n), 1/poly(n), 1 − n −ω(1) )-blindfolded sender, and we may apply Theorem 4.5 to conclude that this contradicts the binding property of the commitment.
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